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vs. 
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00O00 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Appeal from the Order Granting Summary Judgment for the Defendants 
and a Judgment of Dismissal entered in the 
Third Judicial District Court, S^lt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., Section 7 8-2-2(3)(j). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an Appeal from an Order Granting Summary Judgment for 
the Defendants and a Judgment of Dismissal entered in the Third 
1 
Case Noj. 900432 
Priority 16 
District Court, by the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, on August 8, 
1990. A Notice of Appeal was filed on August 31, 1990. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL 
1. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining 
that the Defendants Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers were 
entitled to a conditional privilege under the Fair Report Statute, 
Utah Code Ann. 45-2-3 (1953), as amended? 
2. Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no 
genuine issue of fact remained as to whether Mr. Robert Bowen or 
the State actually stated the things relied upon by the Defendants 
for their claim of privilege? 
3. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining 
that the article was privileged under the Fair Comment Doctrine? 
4. Was it a substantial abuse of discretion by the Trial 
Court to find that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to 
whether the article was privileged under the Fair Comment Doctrine? 
5. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in determining 
that the Defendants were privileged to repeat statements allegedly 
made by one who is privileged or protected by sovereign immunity? 
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6. Was it a substantial abuse of discpetion to find that no 
genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the statements 
allegedly attributed to one who is privileged and protected by 
sovereign immunity were actually made by tl^ at party? 
7. Did the Trial Court err as a matter of law in finding that 
no cause of action was stated for invasion of privacy under both 
the false light and unreasonable publicity doctrines of that cause 
of action? 
8. Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no 
material or genuine issue of fact existed as to whether the 
publication of the information in the article constitutes an 
unreasonable publicity of matters which ha^e no public value? 
9. Did the Trial Court err as a matted of law in finding that 
a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
cannot be maintained? 
10. Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no 
genuine and material issue of fact existed as to whether the 
Defendants intentionally or recklessly caused emotional distress 
to the Plaintiff? 
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11. Was it a substantial abuse of discretion to find that no 
genuine and material issue of fact exists as to whether the 
Plaintiff could show actual malice on the part of the Defendants? 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Ann., Section 45-2-3 (1953) as amended, is the 
central statute relied upon by the Defendants in this case. In 
addition, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is relied upon with 
regard to the Court's granting the Motion of Summary Judgment. 
However, because this Statute and that Rule are too lengthy to set 
out in full, they are included in tne addendum, pursuant to Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure 24(f) and 24(a)(6). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal from the Third District Court's Order 
granting Summary Judgment for the Defendants and against the 
Plaintiff, finding that the Defendants Kristine Messerly and 
Thomson Newspapers were entitled to a conditional privilege that 
required a showing of actual malice in order to state a cause of 
action for libel. Accordingly, the Court found that no genuine 
issue of fact existed as to whether actual malice existed and 
dismissed the Plaintiff's cause of action thereby. In addition, 
the Court dismissed the Plaintiff's other causes of action for 
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invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional 
distress. 
This is a lawsuit against a reporter ar}d her newspaper for an 
article that claimed that the Plaintiff, a nurse, had four 
abortions, a romantic relationship with her employer, was guilty 
of professional impropriety, and illegal drug use. 
This article devastated the Plaintiff! personally, mentally, 
and professionally. She commenced this action as a result on May 
5, 1986 against the state, the newspaper, and the reporter. 
Extensive discovery was carried out. Eventually, the Defendants, 
Thomson Newspaper and Kristine Messerly, filed a motion for summary 
judgment for all causes of action. A hearing was held before the 
Honorable Judge Richard H. Moffat on the defendants' Motions for 
Summary Judgment on Friday, April 27, 1990. The Court took the 
matter under advisement and issued a Minut^ Entry on May 1, 1990. 
The Court thereupon entered a Judgment oij Dismissal, finding no 
cause of action against the Defendants and dismissing the claims 
as to all Defendants (Thomson Newspapers and Kristine Messerly), 
and awarded the Defendants costs in the aniount of $2,005.00. 
An Objection was filed to the award oif costs, which the Court 
denied, and the judgment and order was entered on August 8, 1990 
at 8:07 a.m., Judgment No. 2158714. The Nptice of Appeal was filed 
on 31st day of August, 1990. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff seeks reversal of the Order granting Summary 
Judgment, and Judgment in her favor as a matter of law, or failing 
that a remand for an actual trial on the matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
I. Background of the Case 
This case has arisen out of defamatory statements published 
by Kristine Messerly and the newspaper known as The Daily Spectrum 
(Thomson Newspapers). The Defendants falsely, without any 
foundation, recklessly, and with malice, printed a number of 
defamatory statements about the Plaintiff, including statements 
that she had several abortions, and she was improperly and 
illegally given prescription drugs. The Defendants claimed that 
they made these statements as quotes from a government official. 
However, discovery had shown that this government official, Mr. 
Robert Bowen, denied ever making the statements made in the story, 
and he had no reasonable or logical basis for making them. In 
fact, it appears that the claims regarding abortions were created 
out of whole cloth by the Defendants to both enhance their story 
and to carry out a hidden vendetta against Dr. Brown by Kristine 
Messerly. 
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The Daily Spectrum's and Kristine |Messerly's false and 
unsupported claims about numerous abortions, professional 
impropriety, and drug use had an obvious and devastating effect on 
Ms. Russell's professional and personal reputation in the small 
community of Cedar City. 
They were completely false statements!, but they exposed the 
Plaintiff to hostility and enmity that claims of drug use, and 
affair, and an abortion can bring in a small community like Cedar 
City. Ms. Russell is not a public figure, but her whole reputation 
has been brutally, cruelly and unfairly thrust into the public 
limelight by this vindictive, reckless and groundless story. The 
story is a classic example of a newspaper destroying a person in 
its pursuit of a "good story," a pursuit that maliciously used or 
made up vicious innuendo and rumor when it was presented with the 
opportunity to do so. Indeed, it may be concluded that this story 
was actuated by malice against Dr. Bfrown and a heartless 
malevolence against Ms. Russell. 
Shelly Russell is a nurse who once forked for Dr. David W. 
Brown. The Division of Registration of the State of Utah began an 
investigation of Dr. David Brown regarding his practice as a 
physician, as well as an investigation of Shelly Russell. 
Subsequently, two Petitions were filed by the Division of 
Registration to have both Dr. Brown and Shelly Russell's licenses 
revoked. However, after the investigations, the State agreed to 
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another confidential settlement with Dr. Brown, and agreed to 
another Stipulation with Ms. Russell in which the State agreed to 
drop the Petition and all the allegations against Ms. Russell. As 
a part of both of these Stipulations, the State agreed not to 
reveal the results of the investigation, to close and seal the 
file, and to not make any comments regarding this case. 
Months after the Stipulation was entered, an anonymous 
informant called the Defendant known as The Daily Spectrum (Thomson 
Newspapers) and stated that "some disciplinary action had been 
taken against Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell." Kristine Messerly 
contacted the Division of Registration, and reached an unnamed 
woman, who read to Ms. Messerly the entire Stipulation of Dr. 
Brown. Later, Ms. Messerly spoke with Mr. Robert Bowen. Mr. 
Robert Bowen, Director of the Division of Registration, read the 
Stipulation, Order and Petition, but he indicated that the 
investigative files were confidential. However, Mr. Robert Bowen 
was asked further questions by Ms. Messerly, to which he responded 
in spite of the confidentiality requirement. During these 
additional questions, Mr. Robert Bowen repeated the unsubstantiated 
rumor that Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown had a romantic relationship, 
and there were discussions regarding dilation and curettage, among 
other matters. 
On December 11, 1985, the defamatory story was published in 
The Daily Spectrum. It attacked Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown with 
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false, incorrect, and unsubstantiated clainfis about improper drug 
use, professional impropriety and abortion^. In particular, the 
article makes the false claim that Dr. Brown performed four (4) 
abortions on Ms. Russell, when in fact no abortions have ever been 
performed on Ms. Russell. Most specifically, the article 
incorrectly quotes Mr. Robert Bowen as stating the following about 
dilation and curettage: "It's for abortion.1" 
Mr. Robert Bowen, a representative of the State, denies making 
such a statement. In fact, he denies that he even knew what 
dilation and curettage was, as he is not a physician. Furthermore, 
Mr. Robert Bowen stated that Ms. Messerly had suggested that 
"dilation and curettage were performed for Abortions" to which Mr. 
Bowen stated he did not know. In addition, Dr. Brown has denied 
that he has ever performed an abortion, thajt he is morally opposed 
to abortion. Furthermore, Ms. Messerly h^s claimed that she did 
not believe that the statement was true when it was supposedly made 
by Mr. Robert Bowen. Finally, the storyj reviews at length the 
Petition of charges made against Dr. Brown ana has mischaracterized 
the Petition as "the record." It recit[es the unsubstantiated 
charges as if they had been proven, and they deceptively suggested 
that Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell had admitted to the allegations. 
No where does the story make any effort to jpoint out that Dr. Brown 
and Ms. Russell had denied all the allegations, and the Division 
had not presented any evidence in support (of the allegations. 
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Because of this defamatory article, Dr. Brown and his wife, 
represented by different counsel, sued Thomson Newspapers, Kristine 
Messerly, and the State of Utah citing libel, invasion of privacy, 
breach of the non-disclosure provisions of the Stipulation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. In addition, Shelly 
Russell, represented by B. Ray Zoll, sued Thomson Newspapers, the 
State of Utah, and Kristine Messerly for similar causes of actions. 
Judge Moffat has dismissed the case against the State of Utah based 
upon grounds of sovereign immunity. 
II. Facts to which a Material and Genuine Dispute Exists 
This Appeal is somewhat in the form of a response to a Motion 
for Summary Judgment. As the Court is aware, on an appeal from an 
Order granting Summary Judgment, the Appellant is entitled to have 
his facts viewed in the best possible light. In order to highlight 
and make the Court's investigation of the facts more efficient, the 
Appellant is going to set out the relevant, material, and disputed 
facts in separately numbered paragraphs with reference to the 
depositions, exhibits, and other sources to which they are based. 
In addition, the actual article which is at the center of this 
dispute is attached as Exhibit '" 1" in the addendum to this Appeal. 
1. The Utah Division of Registration investigated Ms. Russell 
and Dr. Brown, and it attempted to have their licenses revoked. 
However, after their investigations, the State agreed to drop the 
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Petition and all the allegations if Ms. Russell merely agreed to 
random drug-testing for a year. In addition, it must be pointed 
out that Ms. Russell has never admitted to any wrongdoing, and the 
State agreed to Ms. Russell's position in that regard. After the 
year of probation, the Petition against Ms. Russell was dismissed 
with prejudice. The allegations of wrongdoing were never proven, 
and they have never been pursued even after extensive 
investigations. That is an undisputed fact. (See Petition, Order 
and Stipulation between Shelly Russell and the Division of 
Registration). 
2. Months after the Stipulation was entered, an anonymous 
informant called The Daily Spectrum and stated that "some 
disciplinary action had been taken against Dr. Brown and Ms. 
Russell." In fact, no disciplinary action was taken against Ms. 
Russell. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 61-63); (See 
also Petition, Order and Stipulation between Shelly Russell and The 
Division of Registration). 
3. Kristine Messerly volunteered to pursue this story, having 
a personal acquaintance with Dr. Brown, there apparently being some 
bad-blood between her mother and Dr. Brown. (Messerly deposition, 
Vol. I at page 65). 
4. Kristine Messerly contacted the Office of the Division of 
Registration, but she was unable to reach Mr. Bowen, who was then 
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the Director of the Division. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at 
Page 86) . 
5. Ms. Messerly did reach an unnamed woman, apparently Mr. 
Bowen's secretary, who read to Ms. Messerly the entire Stipulation 
of Dr. Brown, including the provision that required the Division 
to simply refer third-parties to the Stipulation, Order and 
Petition. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at page 108). 
6. Ms. Messerly later spoke to Mr. Bowen. He also read the 
Stipulation, Order and Petition to her over the phone, and he 
indicated that the investigative files were confidential. However, 
Mr. Bowen was asked further questions by Ms. Messerly, to which he 
responded. (Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 113-125). 
7. Mr. Bowen spoke to Ms. Messerly about the investigation, 
statistics of physicians in general, similar investigations, as 
well as side matters. In particular, Mr. Bowen apparently repeated 
the untrue rumor that Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown had a romantic 
relationship. (Messerly deposition, Volume II at page 41). 
8. On December 11, 1985, the defamatory story was published 
in The Daily Spectrum. It attacked Ms. Russell and Dr. Brown with 
false and unsubstantiated claims of improper drug use, romantic 
liaisons, professional impropriety, and abortions, as well as 
inaccurate claims of substantiation. It was highly vindictive. 
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In particular, the article makes the unsubstantiated claim that Dr. 
Brown performed four (4) abortions on Ms. [Russell. In fact, no 
abortions have been performed on Ms. Russell. (Brown deposition, 
Volume III at page 109). (See Also Article attached as Exhibit "1" 
in the addendum). 
9. In addition, the articles quotes tyr. Bowen at saying: 
When asked what that procedure was "dilation 
and curettage", Bowen said "its for abortion." 
(See Article attached as See Exhibit I" 1" in the addendum to 
Appellant's Brief). 
10. Mr. Bowen denies making such a statement. In fact, he 
denies that he even knew what dilation and curettage was, as he is 
not a physician. (Bowen deposition at page 57). 
11. Furthermore, Ms. Messerly herself has stated that she 
allegedly did not believe that the statement was true when it was 
made. However, she made it anyway, withbut any qualification. 
(Messerly deposition, Volume I at pages 17/-178). 
12. In addition, Dr. Brown has denied that he has ever 
performed an abortion and that he is morally opposed to abortions. 
(Brown deposition, Volume III at page 109)1. 
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13. Finally, the story reviews at length the Petition of 
charges made against Dr. Brown. It mischaracterizes the Petition 
as "the record." It recites unsubstantiated charges as if they 
had been proven, and it deceptively suggests that Dr. Brown had 
admitted to the allegations. Nowhere does the story make any 
effort to point out that Dr. Brown had denied all the allegations 
and that the Division had not presented any evidence in support of 
its allegations. It, with malice, used the dismissed Petition as 
some sort of authoritative findings by a Court in order to malign 
the name of a prominent Cedar City physician whom the reporter had 
a vendetta against. (See Petition against Dr. Brown and the 
Stipulation and Order). 
14. The article's claim that Ms. Russell had four (4) 
abortions performed on her is defamatory on its face. The 
article's continued reference to the Petition's charges as if they 
were authoritative statements of facts, including the 
unsubstantiated and dismissed allegations of improper drug use are 
defamatory on their face. (See Article attached as Exhibit "1" in 
the addendum of this Appeal Brief). 
15. The Respondents' article was written with negligence, 
implied malice and actual malice. Specifically, the story was 
written in order to malign the character and reputation of Dr. 
Brown and Ms. Russell. (See Article attached as Exhibit "1" in the 
addendum to this Appeal Brief). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. The defendants are not entitled to a conditional 
privilege that would require actual malice fto maintain a cause of 
action for libel. Defendants have not established the elements of 
Utah Code section 45-2-3. In addition, the state denies making the 
statements relied upon by the defendants. 
2. The defendants cannot claim a conditional privilege under 
the Fair Comment Doctrine. None of the issues involved in this 
case are of public interest, nor are they comments, but rather 
statements of private facts, that turned out to be false. 
3. The defendants are not entitled to repeat statements'from 
one who is privileged to state them. 
4. The Plaintiff has established evidence of actual malice 
through the testimony of Kristine Messerly. 
5. The Plaintiff has established the elements necessary 
under both the false lights and unreasonable publicity doctrines. 
It compensates the individuals right to be let alone, unlike 
defamation which compensates for the individual's damage to her 
reputation. 
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6. The Plaintiff has established evidence of conduct and the 
aggravating circumstances that are required for the cause of action 
for outrageous conduct. 
7. In a summary judgment, the non-moving party is entitled 
to have her facts viewed in the best possible light, 
ARGUMENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment essentially states 
that the Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers were entitled to 
a conditional privilege to say the things they said in the article, 
and that actual malice is required to be shown before a cause of 
action for defamation will stand. The defendants next claim that 
no evidence of actual malice has been shown and that as a 
consequence, the plaintiff's case should be dismissed. 
The Plaintiff's basic response to these claims is two fold: 
First, the defendants' are not entitled any conditional privileges 
under any of the various theories proffered by the Defendants' 
memorandum, either as a matter of law or according to the facts. 
Second, the Plaintiff has demonstrated evidence of actual malice 
on the defendants' part. 
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The defendants' have imaginatively relied on three different 
theories in support of their claim of a conditional privilege: 
(1) The article is privileged as a fair and true report 
of a judicial, legislative, or other public official 
proceeding, or of anything said ijn the course thereof. 
(2) The article is fair comment, without malice, of a 
matter of public interest. 
(3) The defendants' are merely repeating supposed 
privileged statements made by government officials, and 
that they should therefore be privileged to repeat them. 
The Plaintiff's shall explain the law on each of these 
privileges and show that they do not apply. However, the Plaintiff 
shall first state the proper standard for proving defamation in a 
case not involving a public individual. 
II. NO PRIVILEGE APPLIES UNDER THE FAIR REPORT STATUTE 
A. PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ARE ONLY REQUIRED TO SHOW NEGLIGENCE. 
The 1981 Utah case of Seegmiller v. KSfr, Inc. authoritatively 
stated the appropriate standard of proof f0r private individuals: 
We conclude that it would be inappropriate to 
strike the balance in favor of an actual 
malice test, thereby relieving the media from 
acting with due care and permitting it to 
inflict uncompensable injury on private 
individuals, irrespective of negligent 
conduct. In our view a negligence test best 
accommodates the competing interests. The duty 
of the press to act with reasonable care 
towards private individuals is not unduly 
burdensome and should not 
inappropriate self-censorship. S|c 
interest in the dissemination Of statements 
which are false and which couJ.d have been 
result in 
Jociety has no 
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prevented through the exercise of reasonable 
care. The standard of due care requires only 
that the media personnel act as reasonably 
prudent persons in the industry would act to 
ascertain the truth. 
626 P.2d 968, 974 (Utah 1981). 
In this case, it is clear that Ms. Russell is not a public 
figure by any stretch of the imagination. Specifically, Shelley 
Russell has not thrust herself in the forefront of a public 
controversy to influence the resolution of the issues involved. 
Nor has she sought the public's attention through the notoriety 
of her achievements. These are the standards required to classify 
a plaintiff as a public figure. See Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 
P.2d 968, 974 (Utah 1981) quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323,342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 3009, 41 LEd.2d 789 (1974) 
Consequently, the Plaintiff normally would only have to show 
that Kristine Messerly and Thomson Newspapers failed to act with 
due care. However, the defendants have attempted to squeeze these 
facts alternatively into three (3) qualified or conditional 
privileges. The Plaintiff will show that none of these even 
remotely applies. In addition, the Plaintiff must point out that 
the defendants have the burden of proof in showing that they fit 
in these dubious privileges. Furthermore, these privileges apply 
only to certain fact situations which are controverted by the 
Plaintiff and by sworn testimony. 
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B. PRIVILEGE: THE TRUE AND FAIR REPORT OF A PROCEEDING 
Utah has enacted statutory provisions which specifically 
provide for privileged publication. They are found in Utah Code 
Annotated 45-2-3, as amended in 1975. This section is dispositive, 
so the Plaintiff shall quote it in its entirety: 
45-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast defined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall not be 
considered as libelous or slanderous per se, is one made: 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official 
duty. 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or any 
statement made in any legislative or judicial 
proceeding, or in any oth^r official 
proceeding authorized by law. 
(3) In a communication, without malice, to 
a person interested therein, by one who is 
also interested, or by one who stlands in such 
a relation to the person interested as to 
afford a reasonable ground for supposing the 
motive for the communication innocent, or who 
is requested by the person interested to give 
the information. 
(4) By a fair and true report, without 
malice, of a judicial, legislative, or other 
public official proceeding, or of anything 
said in the course thereof, or of a charge or 
complaint made by any person to a public 
official, upon which a warrant shall have been 
issued or an arrest made. 
(5) By a fair and true report, without 
malice, of the proceedings of a public 
meeting, if such meeting was lawfully convened 
for a lawful purpose and open to the public, 
or the publication or broadcast <i>f the matter 
complained of was for the public benefit. 
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The defendants are specifically relying upon Section 45-2-
3(4) to provide them a privilege to state the things they stated 
in the article. In addition, the defendants rely heavily on 
obscure case law culled from scattered states from around the 
country that deal with the so-called "fair reports privilege." Its 
memorandum completely ignores the statutory language of U.C.A. 4 5-
2-3-(4). It would be helpful to break-down what elements are 
required to satisfy statute. These elements must be proven by the 
defendants to use the privilege: 
(1) The article must be "true and fair." 
(2) The article must be of a judicial, legislative, or 
other public official proceeding, or 
(3) The article must be of anything said in the course 
of the public, official, proceeding, or 
(4) The article must be of a charge or complaint made 
by any person to a public official, upon which a 
warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made. 
It is clear that the defendants' memorandum fails to deal 
adequately with any of the these four elements. The defendants' 
essential argument is that they were simply repeating what the 
Petition before the Division of Registration stated and what Mr. 
Bowen stated. This claim is flawed in a number of ways, any of 
which causes the defendant to fail to qualify under the privilege. 
First, the petition freely quoted by the defendants is simply 
a charge or a complaint. It is not a proceeding. It is not an 
adjudication. It is simply a charge by an authority tasked to 
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charge individuals. In order for the repetition of a charge or 
complaint to be privileged, it must be a charge or complaint upon 
which "a warrant shall have been issued or an arrest made." See 
U.C.A. 45-2-3(4). In this case, no warrant could have been issued 
or an arrest made based upon the Division's Petition. Therefore, 
any reliance upon the statute is misplaced. The reason for this 
provision is obvious: it is to protect innocent individuals from 
being victimized by unproven charges. The defendants made use of 
petition as if they were proven charges. The plaintiff was tried 
and convicted based simply upon the allegations made against a 
third-party, and suffered accordingly. Both justice and the 
language of the statute refuse to permit the defendants to hide 
behind a conditional privilege in such circumstances. 
Second, there was no "public" proceeding. U.C.A. 45-2-3(4) 
and the Restatement 2d of Torts Section 611 both require that there 
be an official proceeding or a public meeting. It is not 
sufficient that there be an official proceeding, the statute 
clearly requires that it also be public. 
In the present case, there was no such proceeding. There was 
preliminary investigation by the state into Dr. Brown's activities, 
and there were subsequent negotiations between the state and Dr. 
Brown and his counsel relative to the drafting of the Stipulation 
and Order. Paragraph 12 of the Stipulation specifically states 
that "no hearing will be held." 
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Third, the statements allegedly made by Mr. Bowen as a 
commentary on the petition were not said in the course of the 
proceeding. The statements were made after the parties had entered 
into stipulations and the petitions were dropped by the Division 
of Registration. They were statements made outside of any 
proceedings. The statement claimed by the defense to have been 
made by Mr. Bowen (he categorically denies making it) were not part 
of any public official proceeding. The matter had been closed. 
All statements attributed to Mr. Bowen were certainly not in the 
course of a proceeding. 
Fourth, the statute requires the report to be a true and fair 
report of the proceeding. In this case, the article was neither 
true nor fair. It was certainly not fair. It simply repeated the 
unproven and unsubstantiated allegations of the petition after it 
had been dismissed. The whole tenor of the story was to smear and 
assassinate the characters of Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell with no 
concern for the truth, no concern for Dr. Brown and Ms. Russell's 
side of the story, no concern for the fact that the Division had 
not proven one allegation found in the petition, and no concern for 
the effects that repeating these allegations would have on the 
reputations of these individuals. The entire slant of the article 
is to authoritatively claim that Dr. Brown and Shelley Russell had 
done all these things stated in the petition. The average reader 
would certainly assume that all the things claimed in the petition 
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were proven, particularly because of the language used by Ms. 
Messerly. However, an informed reader would be shocked at the 
cavalier manner in which the article uses unproven allegations, how 
it bases an article that may well destroy the professional career 
and reputation of two individuals solely on a complaint. It was 
a story premised on the idea that Dr. Brov^ n and Ms. Russell were 
guilty until proven innocent. That is not a fair report. 
Subtle examples of unfairness and untruthfulness are found 
throughout the article. Ms. Messerly has testified to a clear 
understanding of the difference between "allegations" and "facts." 
(Messerly Deposition, Vol. 1 at Page 54). She testified that Mr. 
Bowen made it very clear that the matters set forth in the petition 
are allegations only, and not facts. (Messerly Deposition, Vol. 
II. at Page 120). Despite this warning and her understanding of 
it, the article describes Dr. Brown's and Ms. Russell's conduct 
in a disparaging manner several times, without stating that it was 
only alleged. The headlines read "State Sanctions Cedar Doctor"-
-"Unacceptable Medical Practices." The article characterized Dr. 
Brown's conduct as "improper behavior^" "misconduct," and 
"wrongdoings." None of those are clarified by the explanation that 
the claims were only allegations. The article states that Dr. 
Brown's administration of drugs to Ms. Russell was "addictive" when 
the phrase given to Ms. Messerly actually stated "potentially 
addictive." The article says that Brown's files are "an open book" 
even though Ms. Messerly's understanding was that only the 
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Petition, Stipulation and Order could be disclosed. Ms. Messerly 
had no explanation as to why these inaccuracies appeared in the 
story. (Messerly Deposition, Vol. II at page 50.) The trier of 
fact is entitled to consider the article as a whole in determining 
its defamatory effect and thus, even though much of the article is 
a direct quote from Mr. Bowen, the decision as to the effect of the 
article in total, rests with the trier of fact. Taqawa v. Maui 
Publishing Co. , 427 P.2d 79 (Hawaii 1967). Also, any headline, 
heading or other libelous remarks or comments added or interpolated 
in a report if not spoken by the Plaintiff or during a proceeding, 
are not privileged. Ilsley v. Sentinel Co. 113 N.W. 425, 155 ALR 
1355 (Wis. 1907). 
One of the most difficult aspects of Ms. Messerly's conduct 
as taken from the depositions is her assertion that she is highly 
motivated by "fairness" and "balance." (Messerly Deposition, Vol. 
I at pages 40 and 49). She discusses the details concerning 
deadlines. (Messerly Deposition, Vol. I at pages 36-37). She 
states that in the interest of fairness in every case she tries to 
contact the party the story is targeted at. She indicates that she 
has varying discretion on deadlines. She states that there was no 
announced or imposed deadline in this case. And finally she states 
that she made two efforts to contact Dr. Brown during the 1 and 
1//2 days during which she made her investigation. (Messerly 
Deposition, Vol. I at pages 39-40; Vol. I at page 37; Vol. II at 
page 106; and Vol. II at pages 24-27, respectively). Despite this 
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stated commitment to giving all sides the opportunity to provide 
input, she failed to talk to Dr. Brown or Ms. Russell prior to 
publication of the story. Had she done so, she would have known 
that no abortions were performed, no romantic relationship existed, 
no professional impropriety had taken plac£, and no illegal drug 
use had taken place. 
And most critically, it was not a trud report. It failed to 
accurately state what Mr. Bowen had said. He denies making the 
statement that Ms. Messerly attributes to him. There can be no 
other conclusion other than that defendants are not entitled to 
claim a privilege for things the State nevqr said. 
Even assuming that Mr. Bowen said the procedures were for 
abortion (although this is specifically and earnestly rejected by 
Mr. Bowen), the privilege would not apply. However, the defendant 
is attempting to rely on obscure case-law in other states for the 
proposition that the "fair report" privilege extends to verbal 
statements of officials to news reporters. This reliance is 
misplaced both because the case relied upon is contrary to the 
specific statutory language of U.C.A. 45-^-3(4) and because Mr. 
Bowen's statements, if he made them, were outside the scope of his 
duties. Specifically, Mr. Bowen stipulate^ that he would respond 
to inquiries from third-parties as followss 
The Division and Brown stipulate that the 
Division, Brown and all employees, agents and 
representatives of the Division and Brown, 
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shall respond to any questions by third 
parties concerning the final resolution of 
this matter by reference to the following 
statement: 
The Division's investigation of the 
practice of Dr. Brown has been 
completed. A stipulation resolving 
the Division's Amended Petition has 
been executed. No hearing will be 
conducted. Copies of the Division's 
Amended Petition, and the 
Stipulation and Order in this matter 
are located at the Division's 
Office. 
(See paragraph 12 of the Stipulation and Order dated November 13, 
1985) . 
This paragraph is determinative of both the question of 
whether the statements were made in the course of the proceeding 
and whether it was within the proper scope of Mr. Bowen's official 
duties to make any comments about the case. Clearly, Mr. Bowen 
was not authorized to make any such statement, other than the 
above paragraph. 
The defense goes on at some length about a New Jersey case 
that found the "Fair Reports" privilege applied to oral statements 
made to reporters by officials. However, the case does not 
involve the interpretation of the Utah statute, nor does its facts 
help much in that regard. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court 
authoritatively rejected this argument in the case of Seegmiller 
v. KSL, Inc. , and it determined that the fair report privilege did 
not extend beyond the language of the statute: 
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To extend the concept of a qualified privilege 
to mere allegations of criminal conduct is 
impermissible for two reasons. first, since 
Section 45-2-3(4) limited the privilege to 
actual, official charges of criminal conduct, 
there is a clear implication that mere 
allegations of conduct which might be 
violative of the criminal law should not be 
construed to fall within the privilege. By-
setting the boundaries as it did, the 
legislature must have intended that 
allegations of criminal conduct not buttressed 
by official action should not be included 
within the privilege. 
Nor could the strictness of the above 
provisions be avoided by invoking the "public 
benefit" qualified privilege provided in 
Section 45—2-3(5).... To so construe them 
would simply set at naught the limitations the 
legislature imposed on the privilege 
established for official charges upon which a 
warrant has been issued or an arrest made, 
(emphasis added). 
In addition, the defense has improperly quoted (in their 
summary judgment memorandum), the United States Supreme Court case 
of Barr v. Mateo for support of the proposition that the "Fair 
Reports" doctrine applies to oral communications of officials to 
new reporters. In fact, the case did not deal at all with the 
"Fair Reports" doctrine. Instead, it dealt with the privilege of 
Federal officials to make statements "within the outer perimeter" 
of their duties. 360 U.S. 564, 575 (1959). 
The defendants have not satisfied the statutory requirements 
to claim a conditional privilege. The elements of U.C.A. 45-2-
3(4) have not been met. The article reported charges upon which 
an arrest warrant shall not have been issu0d. It claims to have 
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repeated statements made by Mr. Bowen. However, Mr. Bowen's 
alleged statements were not made "in the course of a proceeding,M 
nor were they proper within the scope of his authorized duties, 
since he had contracted and was ordered by a court not to make any 
statements regarding the case. Finally, the report is neither true 
nor fair. It repeats unproven allegations as if they were 
established facts, and it attributes a statement to a state 
official that he never made, nor would he have the knowledge to 
make such a statement. 
The defendants have failed to prove the elements required for 
the Utah conditional privileges. In the end, however, they must 
still prove that Mr. Bowen made the statements about abortion. He 
has stated under oath that he never made them. A genuine dispute 
of material fact remains on that issue and summary judgment must 
accordingly be denied. It is clear that one cannot be privileged 
to repeat a statement never made by the government. 
III. FAIR COMMENT ON A MATTER OF PUBLIC INTEREST 
The defendants are attempting to claim that the article is a 
"fair comment on a matter of public interest." The defendants' 
memorandum gives a general statement of the doctrine. It is 
principally dealt with in four Utah cases. The first case, 
Williams v. Standard-Examiner Pub. Co., 27 P.2d 1 (Utah 1933), 
introduced the doctrine to Utah. It held that a qualified 
privilege existed for a newspaper to comment and give opinions on 
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the management of the water supply system after an epidemic of 
typhoid fever occurred. The court stated the issue as follows: 
If not true, was the publication made in good 
faith, without actual malice, and with 
reasonable or probable grounds for believing 
it to be true? Were the comments and 
criticisms contained in the publication 
declared on concerning the manner in which 
respondent conducted the waterworks system, 
and how he should be dealt with because of his 
conduct in such respect, reasonable and fair, 
in the light of the facts and circumstances 
that existed or appeared to exist at the time 
such comments and criticisms were published. 
See Williams, 27 P.2d at 14. 
In addition, the case relies heavily upon Newell on Slander 
and Libel, (4th ed.), and quotes extensively from it. In 
particular, it quotes Section 481, which spates: 
1. Criticism deals only with such things as 
invite public attention or call for public 
comment. It does not follow a public man into 
his private life or pry into his domestic 
concerns. 
It also quotes from Section 483, which stages: 
Criticism and comment on well-known or 
admitted facts are very different things from 
the assertion of unsubstantiated facts. A 
fair and bona fide comment on a matter of 
public interest is an excuse of what would 
otherwise be a defamatory publication. The 
statement of this rule assumes the matter of 
fact commented upon to be somehow ascertained. 
It does not mean that a man may invent facts, 
and comment on the facts so invented in what 
would be a fair and bona fide manner on the 
supposition that the facts were true. If the 
facts as a comment upon which the publication 
is sought to be excused do not exist, the 
foundation fails.... It is one thing to 
29 
comment upon or criticize, even with severity, 
the acknowledged or proved acts of a public 
man, and quite another to assert that he has 
been guilty of particular acts of misconduct. 
To state matters which are libelous is not 
comment or criticism. 
(emphasis added) 
A second case is Oqden Bus Lines v. KSL, Inc. 551 P.2d 222 
(Utah 1976). It held that it was proper to comment that the 
Plaintiff "was lax" in its operation of the bus line. This was 
held to be a comment on a matter of public interest, namely the 
school system, which was using the bus line as a contractor to 
transport students. It stated: 
It seems clear to this court that problems 
affecting our schools are matter in which the 
public has a legitimate interest and would be 
within the rule set forth above. 
See Qqden, 551 P.2d 224. 
The last case, Seeqmiller v. KSL, Inc. 626 P.2d 968 (Utah 
1981) provided some insight into the requirements of the "public 
interest" privilege. That case held that it was not a matter of 
public interest to make comments upon the possible cruelty to 
horses. It authoritatively stated the requirements for a matter 
to be of public interest: 
The "public interest" privilege is applicable, 
at least, when the public health and safety 
are involved and when there is a legitimate 
issue with respect to the functioning of 
governmental bodies, officials, or public 
institutions, or with respect to matters 
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involving the expenditure of public funds. 
(emphasis added). 
The fourth case is Utah State Farm Bureau F. v. National Farm, 
198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952). It held that the "Fair Comment" 
doctrine applies to comments and criticism, not mere assertions of 
fact. It stated in its holding that: 
Furthermore, to call someone or refer to him 
as "communist dominated" is a statement of a 
bald and unambiguous fact. It is not a 
criticism or comment on an acknowledged or 
accepted fact. 
See Utah State Farm Bureau, 198 F.2d at 23. 
It is clear that the "Fair Comment" privilege requires three 
elements to be shown: (1) It must involve a matter of public 
interest; (2) it must be a comment; and (3) it must be based upon 
facts that are true. The article does not meet any of these 
requirements. 
First, the issue of alleged over-prescription to a nurse for 
admittedly legitimate health problems is not an issue of public 
interest. Instead, it enters upon what Newell considered matters 
private life and domestic affairs. It is outrageous to believe 
that every nurse taking medication is liable to have that broadcast 
throughout her community with no consideration for the truth or her 
legitimate concerns of privacy. It does not involve issues of 
public health and safety, nor does it implicate a "legitimate issue 
with respect to the functioning of governmental bodies, officials, 
31 
or public institutions, or with respect to matters involving the 
expenditure of public funds." Seeqmiller made it clear that these 
factors must be included to make it a matter of public interest. 
In addition, the claim that dilation and curettages are a 
matter of public interest is one not deserving of a response. 
These are classic matters of private interest, without the remotest 
implication of public safety and health or of governmental bodies. 
Second, the matters must be "a comment." The article does not 
make fair comments or state opinions; it make bold-faced assertions 
of fact. It states that Dr. Brown was causing Ms. Russell to be 
an addict. It states that Ms. Russell was given four abortions. 
It does not draw inferences; it simply makes the assertion that 
Mr. Bowen said the dilation & curettage procedures were for 
abortion. Utah State Farm Bureau made it clear that it must be a 
"comment." 
Third, the whole underlying premise for the story is false. 
It is essential for the comments, if they even exist in this case, 
to be based on legitimate facts. That is, the inferences and 
comments must be founded upon solid, established facts. In this 
case, the claims of addiction and abortions are false, and not 
founded upon legitimate facts. 
In sum, the attempt of the defendants to find shelter in the 
"Fair Comment" privilege is entirely unfounded upon the 
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requirements of the doctrine. The issue is not one of public 
interest, the article is not commentary or criticism—it is bad 
and false reporting of the facts; its suppositions are false, and 
consequently "the privilege must fail." Finally, the defendants 
must still prove that Mr. Bowen made the statement about abortions 
for there to no longer be an issue of material fact. 
IV. NO IMMUNITY TO REPEAT PRIVILEGED STATEMENTS 
This claim is ill-founded. The defendants attempt to rely on 
Section 612 of the Restatement of Torts Second. However, that 
provision is totally inapplicable to them, as the court will 
ascertain simply by reading it. It is a doctrine that protects 
transmitters of information, such as phone companies and telegraph 
companies. It certainly has no place in this case. The section 
states: 
(1) One who provides a means of publication 
of defamatory matter published by another is 
privileged to do so if 
(a) The other is privileged to 
publish it or 
(b) The person providing the means 
of publication reasonably believes 
that the other is privileged to 
publish it. (emphasis added) 
In this case it is clear that thte defendants are not 
providing a means of publishing the defamatory matter, they are 
publishing it. 
33 
Furthermore, the defendants' position was authoritatively 
rejected in the Utah case of Utah State Farm Bureau F. v. National 
Farm U.S. Corp. , 198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952), which held that the 
Utah State Farm Bureau was not privileged to repeat defamatory but 
privileged statements made by a State Senator on the floor of the 
legislature. It stated: 
If the published statement is libelous as a 
matter of law, it is no defense that it was 
repeated from another source. Restatement of 
Law of Torts, Section 578, 580 and 581. It 
follows that the appellants can claim no 
conditional privilege from a reference to the 
Bridges speech if the statement is libelous. 
See Utah State Farm Bureau, 198 F.2d at 23. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that Mr. Bowen denies making 
the statements claimed by the defendants. They can certainly not 
claim a privilege from statements that were not even made by the 
allegedly immune person. Clearly, a genuine issue of material fact 
remains in this regard. 
V. EVIDENCE OF ACTUAL MALICE HAS BEEN SHOWN 
The defendants have failed to satisfy the requirements of any 
conditional privileges. However, this case involve the unusual 
occasion when evidence of actual malice has been found. It would 
be appropriate to define the malice required to overcome any 
privilege. Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc. gives a relevant definition: 
The appropriate standard of malice to be 
applied to overcome the privilege is "an 
improper motive such as a desire to do harm or 
that the defendant did not honestly believe 
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his statements to be true or that the 
publication was excessive. 
See Seeamiller, 626 P.2d at 975. 
Prosser and Keaton on Torts makes this commentary on 
problematic definition of malice in the defamation context: 
The word "malice," which has plagued the law 
of defamation from the beginning, has been 
much used in this connection, and it 
frequently is said that the privilege is 
forfeited if the publication is "malicious." 
It is clear that this means something more 
than the fictitious "legal malice" which is 
"implied" as a disguise for strict liability 
in any case of unprivileged defamation. 
On the other hand, it may mean something less 
than spite, ill will, or a desir^ to do harm 
for its own sake.(emphasis added) 
Perhaps the statement which best fits the 
decided cases is that the court will look to 
the primary motive or purpose by which the 
defendant is apparently inspired. Discarding 
"malice" as a meaningless and quite 
unsatisfactory term, it appears that the 
privilege is lost if the publication is not 
made primarily for the purpose of furthering 
the interest which is entitled to protection. 
If the defendant acts chiefly from motives of 
ill will, he will certainly be liable; and the 
vehemence of his language may be evidence 
against him in this respect.(emphasis added) 
Finally, since there is no social advantage in 
the publication of a deliberate lie, the 
privilege is lost if the defendant does not 
believe what he says. Many courts have gone 
further, and have said that it is lost if the 
defamer does not have reasonable grounds, or 
"probable cause" to believe it to be true, 
(emphasis added) 
Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, 833-835 (5th 
1984). 
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Actual malice is defined in the seminal United States 
Supreme Court case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 255 
280 (1964). It stated: 
The constitutional guarantees require, we 
think, a federal rule that prohibits a public 
official from recovering damages for a 
defamatory falsehood relating to his official 
conduct unless he proves that the statement 
was made with "actual malice"—that is, with 
knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it is false or rnotl. 
The Plaintiff has numerous examples of actual malice on the 
defendants' part. First, and most blatant, the article wrongfully 
stated that Dr. Brown had performed four abortions on the Plaintiff 
within 4-month period. Mr. Bowen has denied making any such 
statements. 
Furthermore, even if Ms. Messerly's claims that Mr. Bowen said 
those statements are taken as true, she knew personally that the 
"abortion" statement was misleading. (Messerly Deposition, Vol. 
II at pages 57-59). Both she and Mr. Kirkpatrick on behalf of The 
Daily Spectrum did not honestly believe the statement to be true 
(or to convey the true meaning), and by distorting the meaning of 
the D&C procedure, they intentionally allowed the publication to 
be run knowing that it was, in this way, excessive. Under the 
standard set in Seegmiller, this element alone would support a 
finding of malice and therefore defeat summary judgment. The 
36 
defendants have in effect admitted to a reckless disregard to the 
article's truth or falsity. 
In addition, the defendants' mischaracterizes the standard for 
summary judgment. A showing of malice has been made by the 
admissions of Kristine Messerly, and the deposition of Mr. Bowen. 
It is the rule in summary judgment that questions of fairness or 
malice are questions of material fact for the fact finder, prior 
to any decision on the points. Furthermore, the jury should 
consider the facts and circumstances of the case in its finding of 
malice, rather than relying upon self-serying statements to the 
contrary. 
VI. A CAUSE OF ACTION EXISTS FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY 
The defendants attempt to minimize the invasive nature of the 
publication of such personal matters of the Plaintiff such as 
dilation and curettages, prescriptions, and her professional life. 
Apparently only one Utah case deals with the subject of invasion 
of privacy, Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 562-566 (Utah 1988), and 
it heavily relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 
652A defines the various forms of invasion of privacy as follows: 
(1) One who invades the right of privacy of another is 
subject to liability for the resulting harm to the 
interests of the other. 
(2) The right of privacy is invaded l^y 
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion 
of another, as stated in Section 652B; or 
37 
(b) appropriation of the other's name or 
likeness, as stated in section 652C; or 
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the 
other's private life, as stated in Section 
652D; or 
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the 
other in a false light before the public, as 
stated in Section 652E. 
There are four basic forms of invasion of privacy. The 
plaintiff is relying upon the claim of publicity that unreasonably 
places the other in a false light before the public. It seems 
clear that the article published about the Plaintiff's medical 
history and professional problems falls within this cause of 
action. 
In the interest of clarity, the point should be emphasized 
that invasion of privacy and defamation are distinct. They each 
protect different interests of the individual. The action for 
defamation protects a person's interest in his good reputation, and 
the action for invasion of privacy protects a person's interest in 
being let alone. Therefore, an action for invasion of privacy may 
lie where an action for defamation also lies. See generally 
Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, page 864 (5th ed. 
1984) . 
In this case, the Plaintiff is claiming that the publication 
of the article in question by The Daily Spectrum gave unreasonable 
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publicity and false light to the Plaintiff'p medical problems and 
questions about the prescription of medication to the Plaintiff, 
as well as incorrect claims about the dilation and curettage, 
including the false claim that they were for abortions. 
A. False Light in the Public Eye 
This form of invasion of privacy is caused by showing the 
plaintiff in a false light before the public. In this case, the 
defendants put the Plaintiff in a false light before the public by 
claiming that she had had four procedures for abortions performed 
upon her, when in fact, the procedures were not for abortions. In 
addition, the article's use of the charge^ in the petitions and 
stipulations of impairment for drug abuse and addiction were not 
accurate, substantiated or admitted. The article used the charges 
to place the Plaintiff in the false light that she had been found 
to have been guilty of all the allegations in the petitions, when 
in fact the petition had been dismissed with prejudice. 
The false light need not be defamatory, although it frequently 
is. It must only be "something that would )pe objectionable to the 
ordinary reasonable person under the circumstances. See generally 
Prosser and Keaton, Prosser and Keaton on Torts, page 864 (5th ed. 
1984). 
It is clear that incorrectly publishing a report that a woman 
had had four abortions performed by her employer would be highly 
objectionable by an ordinary person under the circumstances. 
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Included in the circumstances must be the morals and mores of the 
small community of Ceder City and Southern Utah, where abortions 
are viewed with particular vehemence. Such a false claim must 
cause extreme mortification. 
In addition, the unproven and unsubstantiated claims that she 
had been disciplined and proven to be addicted to medication and 
impaired by medication would also be highly objectionable to any 
ordinary person under the circumstances. 
VII. ACTION FOR INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS CAN BE HELD 
Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344 (1961) is the 
Utah case that sets out the proper elements for the Tort of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress. These elements are 
as follows: 
(1) The defendant intentionally engaged in some conduct 
toward the plaintiff, with the purpose of inflicting 
emotional distress, or 
(2) Where any reasonable person would have been known that 
such would result, and 
(3) His actions are of such a nature as to be considered 
outrageous and intolerable 
(4) In that they offend against the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality. 
Samms, at 347. 
The Samms opinion cites the Restatement of Torts Section 46 
as authority for its formulation of the required elements of the 
tort. However, it adds a test for ascertaining the outrageousness 
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of the conduct: Does it "offend against ihe generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality." The required prima facie 
elements of the Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional 
Distress summarized as follows: 
(1) Defendant's conduct is outrageous 
(2) It is intended to cause emotional distress 
(3) Severe emotional distress resultsj 
(4) A casual connection exists between defendant's conduct 
and plaintiff's distress 
See B.Y.U. Journal of Legal Studies, A Summary of Utah Law: 
INTENTIONAL INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, Chap. Ill, pg. 38 
(1983). 
This section of the analyses of authorities will address each 
of these four (4) elements in turn, discussing their requirements 
and the applicability of defendants' conduct to the Tort. 
A. Outrageous Conduct. Three general categories of 
outrageous conduct are usually enumerated: (1) unusually aggravated 
circumstances; (2) abuse of a position of authority; and (3) 
exploitation of a known vulnerability. We will show that the 
defendants' conduct has entered all three of these categories of 
outrageous conduct. See B.Y.U. Journal of Legal Studies, A Summary 
of Utah Law: INTENTIONAL INJURIES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY, Chap. 
Ill, pp. 38-41 (1983). 
41 
i. Unusually aggravated circumstances may be found in 
a variety of forms. It often includes one extremely unconscionable 
act of viciousness on the part of the defendant. For example, the 
original case of outrageous conduct, William v. Downton, [1897] 2 
Q.B.D. 57, involved the false telling of a man's wife that her 
husband had been in a serious accident. Other cases have included 
falsely claiming a person's son had hanged himself, Bielitski v. 
Obadiak, [1921] 61 Dom L. Rep. 494, and wrapping a dead rat in an 
individual's groceries, instead of bread, Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co. v. Roch, 160 Md. 189, 153 D.22 (1930). Other cases involve 
distasteful conduct that becomes outrageous when repeated or 
prolonged, including the Samms v. Eccles case, which involved 
repeated requests for illicit sex. Other Utah cases, for example, 
Pentecost v. Harward involved a single act of outrageous conduct, 
when a residential manager locked a family out of their apartment 
during the winter months and retained their belongings as security 
for past due rent. 
In this case, we will show that the articles claims that the 
defendant had had four abortions was outrageous. In addition, the 
unsubstantiated claims of the article that the 
ii. Abuse of a Position of Authority can give rise to 
outrageous conduct if "some relation or position which gives the 
defendant actual or apparent power to damage the plaintiff's 
interest" is used by the defendant. For example, a collection 
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agency's use of violent cursing, abuse and accusations of 
dishonesty was found to be outrageous. See e.g. American Finance 
& Loan Corp. v. Coats, 105 Ga. App. 849, 125 S.E. 20 689 (1962); 
American Security Co. v. Cook, 49 Ga. App. 723, 176 S.E. 798 
(1934); Kirbv v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 
625 (1936). 
In this case, the use of the information in the Petition, as 
well as the groundless and unsubstantiated claims set out in more 
detail above. This cause of action provides a remedy for the 
individual who is emotionally violated by conduct of another that 
is outside of the norms of civilized society. The use of mass 
publication and the statement of baseless falsehoods has caused Ms. 
Russell to be emotionally violated, in a way that would shock most 
in society. 
VIII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. Summary Judgment: The Appropriate Standard. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the disposition of a 
case if the following three elements are established by a moving 
party: 
1. It must be shown that no genuine issue of material 
fact exists. 
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2. The moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. 
3. This showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all 
reasonable possibilities that the losing party could win, if given 
a trial. 
See Thorn Cook v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Copper 
State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 90 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 23 (1988); Briqqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987); Thenq v. Seagull Enterprises, Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 
1979); Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 (Utah 1988); 
Snyder v. Berkley, 693 P.2d 64 (Utah 1984); Bower v. Riverton City, 
656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 
40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962); Judkins v. Toore, 27 Utah 2d. 17, 492 P.2d 
980 (1972); Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 
221, 354 P.2d 559 (1960); Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 
431 P.2d 126 (1967); Sandberg v. Klien, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978). 
B. Evidence is Viewed Most Favorably for the Potential 
Loser. 
A court considering a motion for summary judgment is 
constrained in a number of ways. In particular, "all evidence, 
admissions and inferences" must be "viewed in the light most 
favorable to the loser." Bullock v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, 
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Utah 201/ 354 P.2d 559, "the party against whom the judgment has 
been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented, and all 
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most 
favorable to him." Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 
P.2d 297 (1953); See Geneva Pipe Co. v. S&H Ins. Co., 714 P.2d 648 
(Utah 1986); Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance 
Furn. Co. , 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Brigps v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
281 (Utah Ct, App. 1987); Theng v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 
526 (Utah 1979), or "submission in support of or opposition to a 
motion for summary judgment should be looked at in the light 
favorable to the non-moving party's position." Durham v. Margetts, 
571 P.2d 1332 (Utah 1977); Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
C. Summary Judgment Should be Invoked Very Reluctantly. 
In addition, the remedy of summary judgment should be invoked 
very reluctantly, since it denies the non-winning party the chance 
to prove its case to the finder of fact. "Because a summary 
judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their case to the 
court, courts are and should be, reluctant to invoke this remedy," 
Brandt v, Springville Banking Co., 10 Utah 20 350, 353 P.2d 460 
(1960). 
In addition: 
Because disposition of a case on summary 
judgment denies the benefit of a trial on the 
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merits, the appellate court must review the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
losing parties, and affirms only where it 
appears there is no genuine dispute as to any 
material issues affect, or were, even 
according to the facts as contended by the 
losing party, the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
See Reeves v. Geigy Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988); Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. 
Co., 90 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (1988); Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Theng v. Seagull Enter. Inc., 595 P.2d 526 
(Utah 1979). 
D. A Court May Not Consider Weight or Credibility of 
Evidence. 
A court may not take into account the weight of evidence as 
the credibility of evidence: 
The court cannot consider weight of testimony or 
credibility of witnesses on a motion for summary 
judgment; the court simply determines that there is no 
disputed issue of material fact and that as a matter of 
law one party should prevail. 
Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 (1967). See 
also Sandberg v. King, 576 P.2d 1291 (Utah 1978); Spor v. Crested 
Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304 (Utah 1987); W. M. Barnes 
Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (1981). 
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E. Court May Not Use Summary Judgment to Ascertain What the 
Facts Are. 
A court may not use summary judgment to ascertain what the 
facts actually are in a dispute; it may only examine the evidence, 
affidavits, interrogatories and pleadings to determine if a 
material fact issue remains: 
Summary judgment is never used to determine what the 
facts are, but only to ascertain whether there are any 
material issues of fact in dispute• 
Hill ex rel. Foael v. Grand Cent. Inc., 25 Utah 2d 121, 477 P.2d 
150 (1970). See accord Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 
740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); W. M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56 (Utah 1981). 
F. Heavy Burden to Establish no Genuine Issue of Material 
Fact. 
The sufficiency of a controversy as to material fact may be 
established by affidavits, answers to interrogation, depositions, 
admissions and the pleadings themselves, although allegations in 
a pleading are insufficient to rebut an affidavit based on personal 
knowledge. The opposing party must simply show the presence of 
some material fact issue that is controverted by affidavit or 
discovery? 
In order for a non-moving party to oppose successfully 
a motion for summary judgment and send the issue to a 
fact-finder, it is not necessary for the party to prove 
its legal theory; it is only necessary for non-moving 
party to show "facts" controverting the facts stated in 
moving party's affidavit. 
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Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
This threshold standard has been explained in the 
following manner: 
It only takes one sworn statement to dispute averments 
on other side of controversy and create issues of facts 
precluding summary judgment. 
Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). 
The threshold standard for summary judgment has been 
articulated in a number of ways. It is, however, clearly a 
difficult standard to attain: 
Summary judgment cannot properly be granted if the 
allegations of the plaintiff's complaint stand in 
opposition to the averments of the affidavits so that 
there are controverted issues of fact, the determination 
of which is necessary to settle the rights of the 
parties. 
Christensen ex rel. Christensen v. Financial Serv. Co., 14 Utah 2d 
101, 377 P.2d 1010 (1963) . 
"The presence of a dispute as to material facts disallows 
the granting of summary judgment." Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. 
Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
"Unless there is a showing that the disfavored parties 
cannot produce evidence that would reasonably support a finding in 
their favor on a material or determinate issue of fact, a summary 
judgment is erroneous." Bridge v. Backman, 10 Utah 2d 366, 353 
P.2d 909 (1980). 
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It must appear to a certainty [emphasis added] that the 
plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state 
of facts which could be proved in support of its claim 
before a judgment on the pleading may be granted. 
Security Credit Corp. v. Willy, 1 Utah 2d 254, 265 P.2d 422 (1953). 
A summary judgment must be supported by evidence, 
admissions and inferences which, when viewed in the light 
most favorable to the loser, show that "there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law"; such 
showing must preclude all reasonable possibilities that 
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which 
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. 
Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 201, 354 P.2d 
559 (1960). 
Such showing [no genuine issue of material fact] must 
preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibilities that the losing par^y could win if given 
a trial. 
Frederick May & Co. v. Dun, 13 Utah 2d. 40, 368 P.2d 266 (1962); 
Judkins v. Toone, 27 Utah 2d. 492 P.2d 98 (1972). 
Summary judgment should be granted only when it is clear 
from the undisputed facts that the opposing party cannot 
prevail. 
Conder v. D. L. Williams & Assoc, 739 P.2d 634 (Utah Ct. Ap. 
1987); Bray Lines v. Utah Carriers, Inc., 739 P.2d 1115 (Utah Ct. 
App 1987) . 
The above quotations and references illustrate the 
difficult burden needed to be shown on summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court will readily discover that the statements relied 
upon by the defendants to provide them a safe-haven to libel 
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private individuals were never made by the state, and it is 
impossible to sustain the lower court's order granting summary 
judgment. In addition, the other various and imaginative 
privileges being reached for by the defendant are simply not 
applicable. Finally, the causes of action for invasion of privacy 
and intentional infliction of emotional distress are sustainable 
both because their elements have been satisfied, but they are also 
sustainable because of these causes provide a remedy for the 
different interests being damaged by terrible and cruel statements 
presented to the Plaintiff's entire community. There must be a 
remedy for this kind of conduct. 
Accordingly, the court should reverse the trial court's order 
granting summary judgment, and find that the Plaintiff is entitled 
to relief as a matter of law. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 1991 
tffc '*-n B. R&Y ZOJiL j ^) 
Attorney for th4 P l a t h t i f f 
S h e l l e y R u s s e l l ! 
jUJi 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that 4 tr^ ie and correct copies 
of the foregoing document was mailed, postage prepaid, on the 
18th day of January, 1991 to Randy Dryer, 185 South State, 
Suite 700, Salt Lake City, Utah, 8411! 
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cords. 
Brown also allegedly failed to ord-
er adequate monitoring of F-usseHVx I 
eooditioa, and administered coo(o) 
trolled substances, to her intrave-W 
oeousry without an "stabtished fntra-
veeous access, Bowen said. 
f* On Jan. IS, 2984, Brown agreed, lin-
ger sanctions imposed by Valley 
View Medical Center, to c^scor.tinue 
any treatment of Russell, and to tanr^ 
her care over to t*o o&^r doc tors; •*,' 
Ecwen said. 
~~~In violation of that agreement. 
Brown aCe^edly "continued to prt^- ] 
fcribe and ad.Tiin:ster controlled^; 
sokstacces" to Russell witfco*it ad-^' 
vising the two new doctors, be said. 
- Brown's repeated administratioo 
of narcotic t.-ugs to RusseH, Tided in 
the record to have b^en "habituated 
to controlled substances," was an ac- -
tioo called "addictive 3nd cot justi'*> 
S^bJe," he said. . - v-y 
P^  In addition, Brawn atkgedly ad-
ministered "a c^ujntity of controlled 
Brown 
!Q addition, Brown allegedly failed 
to use "timely, proper intervention" 
in "dosing an unclean puncture 
wound** on the foot of Brad Hulet, an 
action deemed improper in the re-
Icprd, Bowen said. 
f And in September 1984. Brown a)-
' legedry "failed to order medical 
care" for a premature infant, includ-
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DIVISION OP REGISTRATION 
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Fourth Floor 
Heber H. Wells Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE LICENSE OF 
SHELLEY L. RUSSELL 
TO PRACTICE AS A 
REGISTERED NURSE 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
P E T I T I O N 
CASE NO. RG-84-83 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
These causes of action were investigated by the Utah Division of 
Registration (the Division) upon complaints that RUSSELL, a licensee of the 
Division, has engaged in acts and practices which constitute violations of the 
Utah Nurse Practice Act, Utah Code Ann-, Chapter 58-31. 
PARTIES 
1. The D iv i s ion i s a Division of the Department ot Business 
Regula t ions of the S t a t e of Utah, e s t ab l i shed by v i r t u e of Sect ion 58-1-1 of 
the Utah Code. 
2 . SHELLEY L. RUSSELL i s a l i c ensee of the Div i s ion . 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
3. a. On or about February to April* 1984, RUSSELL received 
administrations and prescriptions for controlled substances from several 
physicians without making each aware of the controlled substance she was 
receiving from the others. 
b. On or about March 17, 19849 RUSSELL misrepresented the 
results of past endoscopic tests in an effort to obtain controlled substances. 
c. On or about February to August, 1984, RUSSELL was impaired 
because of drug dependence. 
COUNT I 
4. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 3 above as if fully set out 
herein. 
5. Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code provides that the Division 
may revoke a license if the holder is guilty of unprofessional conduct. 
6. Section IV C-15 of the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses 
defines unprofessional conduct to include violating state or federal drug laws. 
7. Section 58-37-8(4)(a)(ii) of the Utah Code provides it to be a 
violation to procure or attempt to procure controlled substances by 
misrepresentation^ deception or subterfuge. 
8. By engaging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3 above, RUSSELL has violated the provisions of IV C-15 of the Rules of 
Conduct Governing Nurses, constituting grounds for the revocation of her 
license under the provisions of Section 58-31-14(b) of the Utah Code. 
-3-
COUNT II 
9. The Division realleges and incorporates by reference the 
allegations set forth in paragraphs 1 through 8 above as if fully set out 
herein. 
10. Section 58-31-14(c) of the Utah Code provides that the Division 
may revoke or suspend a nurse*s license if the nurse is unfit or incompetent 
by reason of negligence, habits such as habitual intemperance, or addiction to 
habit-forming drugs* 
11. By engaging in the acts and practices contained in paragraph 
number 3, RUSSELL is in violation of the provisions of 58-31-14(c), 
constituting grounds for the revocation of her license under the provisions of 
Section 58-31-14 of the Act. 
WHEREFORE, the Division requests the following relief: 
1. That RUSSELL be adjudged and decreed to have engaged in the acts 
alleged herein* 
2. That by engaging in the above acts, RUSSELL be adjudged and 
decreed to have violated the provisions of the Utah Nurse Practice Act. 
3. That an Order be issued revoking the license of SHELLEY L. 
RUSSELL to practice as a Registered Nurse. 
& day of v X y W ^ DATED t h i s W  f v ^^^TZ^Aj^e . 1984. 
£k±Z_J&££2=i. 
DIVISION OF RSGJJ&f RATION 
Utah Departsttfnt of Business Regulation 
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STATB OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Oo the Cr+*- day of _ yd'j'pi/It*// ^
 h_, 1984, personally 
appeared before me Steven Davit , the signer 
of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same on behalf of the Division of the Utah Department of Business Regulation. 
NOTARY PUBLIC T 
My Commission Expires: 
DAVID L. WILKINSON (#3472) 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIHAN (#2891) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Division Chief 
NEAL T. GOOCH (#1216) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Tax and Business Regulation Division 
Room 130 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 533-5319 
BEFORE THE DIVISION OF REGISTRATION 
STATE OF DTAH 
IN THE KATTER OF THE LICENSE ) STIPULATION 
OF SHELLEY L. RUSSELL TO ) 
PRACTICE AS A REGISTERED ) Case No. RG-84-83 
NURSE IN THE STATE OF UTAH ) 
The Division of Registration of the Department of 
Business Regulation of the State of Utah ("Division"), by and 
through i t s attorney, Neal T. Gooch, Assistant Attorney General, 
md Shelley L. Russell ("Respondent"), l icensee o£ the Division, 
:hrough her a t t o r n e y , B. Ray Zoll , hereby s t i pu l a t e and agree as 
follows: 
STIPULATION 
1 . Respondent i s duly licensed by the State of Utah to 
>ractice as a registered nurse. 
2 . Pursuant to formal complaint, the Division i n i t i a t -
d an i n v e s t i g a t i o n as provided in Utah Code Ann. S 58-1-1 e t 
eq . (1953), as amended. 
3* Upon completion of its investigation, the Division 
filed a petition alleging that Respondent had violated Utah Code 
Ann* SS 58-31-14(b>, 58-37-8(4) (a) (ii) , and Section IV C-15 of 
the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses. 
4. Respondent denies the allegations made by the 
Division in paragraph 3 and denies any wrongdoing or violation of 
law* 
5. Respondent asserts that she enters into this stipu-
lation for the sole purpose of resolving the matter before the 
Division, and by so doing makes no admission as to any violation 
of law or the Rules of Conduct Governing Nurses, or other wrong-
doing either legal or equitable. 
6. Respondent acknowledges that she enters into this 
stipulation voluntarily, and that no threat or promise whatsoever 
has been made by the Division, or any member of the staff of the 
Division or any officer, agent or representative of the Division 
to induce her to enter into this stipulation. 
7« Respondent and the Division agree that, upon ap-
proval by the Director of the Division of Registration, this 
stipulation shall be a final compromise and settlement of all 
counts in the petition filed by the Division in this matter. 
However, the Division reserves the right to discipline the Re-
spondent in the event the terms and conditions ot this stipula-
tion are violated or other circumstances come into existence 
which warrant discipline. In the event the Director fails to 
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agent during the one-year period provided in paragraph 8c, except 
for emergency reasons or exigent circumstances* 
f. In the event she refuses to allow the taking of 
blood and/or urine samples, or the samples prove posit ive for 
controlled substances for which Respondent has no legal prescrip-
tion, Respondent agrees to the suspension of her l icense to 
practice as a registered nurse for a period of one year* The 
Issue of whether or not Respondent has refused to allow the 
raking of blood and/or urine samples or whether or not the posi-
:ive t e s t result for controlled substances v io lates the s t ipula-
tion i s to be determined by the Nursing Board in open hearing 
ifter appropriate not ice . 
g. Respondent shall not be treated by Dr. David Brown 
or shall Dr. David Brown or his partners prescribe controlled 
ubstances for Respondent during the one-year period provided in 
aragraph 8c, except for emergency or exigent circumstances. 
h. Emergency reasons and exigent circumstances shall 
e defined for purposes of paragraphs 8e and 8g as reasons or 
ircuznstances for which no other physician in the community i s 
/ a i lab le at the time the Respondent requires treatment or the 
cescription. Such reasons or circumstances must be of an 
ctraordinary nature and more than a mere request for re l ie f of 
i in. 
9. The Division shall dismiss i t s case against Respon-
tnt with prejudice upon the completion of the one-year period of 
- 4 -
approve th i s s t ipulat ion, i t wi l l be of no further force and 
e f f e c t . 
8. Respondent and the Division agree as fol lows: 
a* Ihe Division shall continue the hearing in this 
natter for an indef inite period. 
b. This st ipulation shall not be admitted as evidence 
against Dr. David Brown in the case the Division of Registration 
brings against Dr. David Brown* 
c. Respondent voluntarily agrees to submit to the 
random taking of urine and/or blood upon request by the Division 
for a period of one year beginning with the date the order ap-
proving the s t ipulat ion in this matter i s signed by the Division. 
The samples are not to exceed two in any given month and shall be 
taken by a l icensed third party, to be agreed upon by the par-
t i e s . The taking of urine samples shall be observed by the 
igreed upon third party. The cost of processing the samples 
shall be borne by the Division. The samples shall be taken 
f i thin four hours of the request of the Division. 
d. Respondent shall provide a telephone number or 
lumbers at which she can be reached during the hours of eight 
> ,clock (8:00) a.m. "and f ive o'clock (5:00) p.m. on a daily 
>asis. She shall also keep her mailing address current with the 
division. 
e. Respondent shall not refuse to allow the taking of 
>lood and/or urine samples by the Division or the Divis ion's 
- 3 -
paragraph 8c# provided Respondent's samples of blood and/or urine 
remain free of controlled substances for which she has no legal 
prescript ion. 
10 . Respondent's l icense to practice as a registered 
lurse shall remain in fu l l force and effect , conditioned only as 
provided herein* .
 % 
DATED t h i s / ^ day of *ft£3n 1985. 
SHELLEY V. RUSSELL 
Respondent 
B. 
Attorney Cor Respondent 
ROBERT 0. BOWEN, Director 
Division of Registration 
NEAL T. GOOCH, Assistant Attorney 
General, Counsel for Division 
of Registration 
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statement that might have been made in that? 
A I don't. 
Q Could you read number 16, please. 
A "Brown is recorded to have performed dialation and 
curettage — I'm not sure how you say it — procedures four 
times from April, 1982 to August, 1983 on Russell, the record 
says." 
Q Do you recall making any statement to that effect? 
A No. 
Q Do you recall a dialation, ^nd I believe it's 
curettage, do you recall any discussibn in relation to 
dialation and curettage at all? 
A I recall that I did not know the meaning of those 
words. 
Q Have you ever heard those words before to the best 
of your recollection? 
A Only when I first read the petition, and I didn't 
pay attention to them enough then, but I really didn't know, 
I had heard the word curettment and l| wasn't sure it derived 
what they were, I didn't know what thby were. 
Q You mean at the time of thej discussion with Ms. 
Messerly? 
A Yes. 
Q Do you know what those wordls mean? 
A I do. 
56 
1 Q Can you tell me what they mean as best you 
2 understand them at this time? 
3 A Well, I think it has something to do with the, 
4 again, Ifm not very specific on that, but a cleansing of a 
5 lady's vaginal tract or whatever, I'm not sure really still. 
6 Q Do you recall who told you what it meant and when 
7 that was? 
8 A No, I don't really, other than ^he made some 
9 statements about it. I think her mother was a nurse, and she 
10 had to explain to it to me, but I did not know at that time, 
11 Q Okay. Now, you said she explained it to you, you 
12 mean Ms. Messerly? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Tell me to the best of your recollection what she 
15 said about a dialation and curettage. 
16 A Well, I was struggling somewhat with those words as 
17 we were going over the petition and we used the words. £nd if 
18 my memory serves me correctly she said, and that's abortion, 
19 and I says, well, I don't know, is it, and she says, yes, it 
20 is. 
21 Q What was your response, other than what you've just 
22 indicated? 
23 A Nothing beyond that. 
24 Q Had you ever heard the words or initials D. and C. 
25 before other than in connection with the doctor? 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A 
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Yes, I had, and I did not, I didn't know that it 
meant that. I had heard it in female jargon, yes. 
Q 
Messerly 
A 
Q 
made by 
and cure 
A 
Q 
remember 
A 
Q 
A 
were not 
quotes," 
But at the time of your conversation with Ms. 
you didn't associate the two? 
I didn't. 
Do you recall any other discussions or statements i 
you or by Ms. Messerly in relation to the dialation 
ttage on Ms. Russell in that conversation? 
No. 
So you've told us essentially all that you can 
that was discussed? 
Yes. 1 
For the record could you read 17 and 18, please. 
"That number of procedures in that period of time 
medically indicated," that statement is in 
the charges state." And then paragraph, "When asked 
what that procedure was Bowen said, it's for abortion." 
Q 
A 
Q 
way you 
A 
Q 
A 
proper i 
And it's for abortion is in quotes? j 
It's in quotes. 
So you don't recall it that way, you recall it the 
just told us; is that correct? 
That's correct. 
Could you read number 19, please. 
"In addition Brown allegedly failed to use, 'timely, 
ntervention in — now we've got a quote within a 
DEPOSITION OF KRISTINE MESSERLY IS NOT AVAILABLE. 
WILL APPEAR UNDER SEPARATE COVER. 
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r slander, within three days after learning of the 
iistake or within three days after service upon the 
erson broadcasting that libel or slander, by the 
arty aggrieved, of a written notice specifying the 
tatement alleged to be erroneous or, in case such 
otice is not served, in the manner and within the 
ime above specified after the filing of the complaint 
nd service of the summons in said action, then the 
laintiff shall recover only actual damages 
v2) This section shall not apply in the case of any 
bel or slander against any candidate for a public 
Sice at any general or pnmary election, or any 
vowed candidate for nomination to any office before 
ny political convention, unless the retraction of the 
large was made in the same manner as provided for 
ther retractions imder this section within 24 hours 
f the time the person broadcasting that libel or slan-
er became aware of the mistake, but in no case later 
ran three days before the holding of such general or 
nmary election or political convention A written 
jxt of the retraction shall be made available to the 
indidate immediately after it has been broadcast, 
his retraction shall be m lieu of any other retraction 
erem provided for IVJS 
5-2-2. Libel and slander defined. 
As used in this chapter 
(1) "Liber means a malicious defamation, ex-
pressed either by printing or by signs or pictures 
or the like, tending to blacken the memory of one 
who is dead, or to impeach the honesty, integrity, 
virtue or reputation, or publish the natural de-
fects of one who is alive, and thereby to expose 
him to public hatred, contempt or ridicule 
(2) "Slander" means any libel communicated 
by spoken words 1975 
5-2-3. Privileged publication or broadcast de-
fined. 
A privileged publication or broadcast which shall 
3t be considered as libelous or slanderous per ^ is 
le made 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty 
(2) In any publication or broadcast of or an> 
statement made in any legislative or judicial pro-
ceeding, or in any other official proceeding autho-
rized by law 
(3) In a communication, without malice, to a 
person interested therein, by one who is also in-
terested, or by one who stands in such relation to 
the pet son interested as to afford a reasonable 
ground for supposing the motive for the commu-
nication innocent, or who is requested by the per-
son interested to give the information 
(4) By a fair and true report, without malice 
of a judicial, legislative, or other public official 
proceeding, or of anything said in the course 
thereof i>r of a charge or complaint made by any 
person to a public official, upon which a warrant 
shall have been issued or an arrest made 
(5) By a fair and true report, without malice 
of the proceedings of a public meeting if such 
meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful pur-
pose and open to the public, or the publication or 
broadcast of the matter complained of was for the 
public benefit. 1975 
>-2-4. Malice not inferred from publication. 
In the cases provided for in Subsections (3), <4) and 
) of the preceding section, malice is not inferred 
om the communication or publication 1953 
45-2-5. Radio or television broadcasting station 
or network of stations. 
No person, firm, or corporation owning or operating 
a radio or television broadcasting station or network 
of stations shall be liable under the laws of libel, slan-
der or defamation on account of having made its 
broadcasting facilities or network available to any 
person, whether a candidate for public office or any 
other person, or on account of having originated or 
broadcast a program for discussion of controversial or 
any other subjects, in the absence of proof of actual 
malice on the part of such owner or operator In no 
event, however, shall any such owner or operator be 
held liable for any damages for any defaniatory state-
ment uttered over the facilities of such station or net-
work by or on behalf of any candidate for public of-
fice ISM 
45-2-6. Right of station to require submission of 
matter intended to be broadcast. 
Any person, firm, or corporation owning or operat-
ing a radio or television broadcasting station shall 
have the right, but shall not be compelled, to require 
the submission and permanent filing, in such station, 
of a copy of the complete address, script, or other form 
of expression, intended to be broadcast over such sta-
tion before the time of the intended broadcast thereof 
1M3 
45-2-7. Limitations and restrictions — Immune 
from liability — Due care. 
Except as provided in Section 45-2-1 5» nothing in 
this act contained shall be construed to relieve any 
person broadcasting over a radio or television station 
from liability under the law of libel, slander, or defa-
mation Nor shall anything else in this act be con-
strued to relieve any person, firm, or corporation 
owning or operating a radio or television broadcast-
ing station or network from liability under the law of 
libel slander or defamation on account of any broad 
cast prepared or made by any such person, firm, or 
corporation or by any officer or employee thereof in 
the course of his employment In no event, however 
shall any such person, firm or corporation be liable 
for my damages for any defamatory statement or <Kt 
published or uttered in or as a part of a visual or 
bound broadcast unless it shall be alleged and proved 
hv the complaining party that such person firm or 
corporation has failed to exercise due care to prevent 
the publication or utterance of such statement or id 
in such broadcast Bona fide compliance with any fed 
eral law or the regulation of any federal regulatory 
igencv shall be deemed to constitute such due care as 
hereinabove mentioned 1973 
45-2-8. Liability in case of joint operation. 
In any case where liability shall exist on account of 
any broadcast where two or more broadcasting or 
television stations were connected together simulta 
neously or by transcription, film, metal tape, or other 
approved or adapted use for joint operation, in the 
making of such broadcast such liability shall be con 
fined and limited solely to tne person, firm, or corpo-
ration owning or operating the radio or television hta 
tion which originated such broadcast i»»3 
45-2-9. Repealed. i953 
45-2-10. Privileged broadcasts. 
\ privileged broadcast which shall not} be consid-
ered as libelous, slanderous, or defamatory per se, is 
one made 
(1) In the proper discharge of an official duty 
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Rule 55. Defaul t 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judg-
ment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to 
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these 
rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk 
shall enter his default 
(2) Notice to party in default After the 
entry of the default of any party, as provided in 
Subdivision (a)(l> of this rule, it shall not be nec-
essary to give such party in default any notice of 
action taken or to be taken or to serve any notice 
or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, 
except as provided in Rule 5(a), in Rule 58Aid) or 
in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of 
damages of the nondefaultmg party 
tb) J u d g m e n t Judgment by default may be en-
tered as follows 
d) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim 
against a defendant is for a sum certain or for a 
sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served 
otherwise than by publication or by personal ser-
vice outside of this state, the clerk upon request 
of the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the 
amount due and costs against the defendant, if 
he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if 
he is not an infant or incompetent person 
(2) By the c o u r t In all other cases the party 
entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to 
the court therefor If, m order to enable the court 
to enter judgment or to carry it into effect it is 
necessary to take an account or to determine the 
amount of damages or to establish the truth of 
any averment by evidence or to make an investi-
gation of any other matter the court may con-
duct such hearings or order such references as it 
deems necessary and proper 
<c) Setting aside defaul t For good cause shown 
the court mav set aside an entry of default and if a 
judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b) 
(d) Plaintiffs, coun terclaiman ts, cross-claim-
ants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the 
party entitled to the judgment by default 13 a plain 
tiff, a third-party plaintiff or a party who has pleaded 
a cross claim or counterclaim In all cases a judgment 
by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 54»c 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or 
agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be en 
tered against the state of Utah or against an officer or 
agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his 
claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court 
(Amended effective Sept 4, 1985 ) 
Rule 56. Summary judgment 
(a) For c la imant A party seeking to recover upon 
a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a 
declaratory judgment may, at any time after the expi-
ration of 20 days from the commencement of the ac 
tion or after service of a motion for summary judg-
ment by the adverse party, move with or without sup-
porting affidavits for a summary judgment in his fa-
vor upon all or any part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a 
claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a 
declaratory judgment is sought mav, at any time 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum 
mary judgment in his favor as to ill or «nw ~-
thereof ' * * 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The m* 
tion shall be served at least 10 days before the hn^ 
fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to »h-
day of hearing may serve opposing] affidavit* THe 
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if th* 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogator** 
and admissions on file, together with the affidav iu s 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to anr 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled u 
a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment 
interlocutory in character, may be rendered on ib» 
issue of liability alone although there is a genuw* 
issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If <* 
motion under this rule judgment is nop rendered upoo 
the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial t« 
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion by 
examining the pleadings and the evidence befor« a 
and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ** 
certain what material facts exist without substantial 
controversy and what material facts are actually »n«J 
in good faith controverted It shall thereupon maka 
an order specifying the facts that appear without *ub* 
stantial controversy, including the extent to whtcb 
the amount of damages or other relief is not in contro. 
versy and directing such further proceedings in tIn-
action as are just Upon the trial of the action th» 
facts so specified shall be deemed established, and th# 
trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; de-
fense required. Supporting and opposing affidavit* 
shall be made on personal knowledge shall set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence w l 
shall show affirmatively that the affiant is compel* nt 
to testily to the matters stated therein Sworn or iw 
tified copies of all papers or parts thereof reterivd i 
in an affidavit shall be attached thereto or s»iv«l 
therewith The court may permit affidav its to lw -up-
plemented or opposed by depositions answer^ <«< n> 
terrogatones, or further alfidavits VVpen a n ot m » » 
summary judgment is made ard supported .« p> > 
vided in this rule an adverse party may not n *» »ip« M 
the mere allegations or denials of his pleading I *»' 
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro^ > *< d n 
this rule must set forth specific facts showing tb«c 
there is a genu'ne issue for trial If he docs not «» 
respond, summary judgment, if appropriate h^ ill K 
entered against him 
if) When affidavits are unavailable. h^< uld 
appear from the affiaavits of a party opposing tt» 
motion that he cannot for reasons stated pre t*nt 'v 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition f'"' 
court may refuse the application for judgment n " " 
order a continuance to permit affidavits <.o v* < 
Gained or depositions to be taken or discover <> " 
had or may make such other order as is ust 
g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should « »P 
pear to the satisfaction of the court at anv time th *l 
any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this m * 
ire presented in bad faith or solely for the p'jrp M* 
delay, the court <*hall forthwith orde^ the pirtv *»' 
ploying them to pay to the other party the amoun 
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the ii'l( 
vits caused him to incur, including reasonable »tio 
ney s lees, and any ofiending party or attornev t° * 
be adjudged guilty of contempt 
Rule 57 Declaratory judgments.
 4 f 
The procedure for ootaming a declarator* J1*
 { 
men* pursuant to Chapter n of Title fb I ^ p 
